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Abstract 
 
In March 2014, at the time of Russia’s takeover of Crimea, the heads of fourteen Orthodox 
churches convened under the leadership of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, the Istanbul-
based primus inter pares in Eastern Orthodoxy, and announced that a ‘Holy and Great Synod 
of the Orthodox Church’ would be held in 2016. The Synod, which took place in June 2016 in 
Crete, was a unique ecclesiastical gathering bringing together competing geopolitical visions 
of religion, state and power. This article examines the political mobilisation of Orthodox 
churches by contextualising the holding of the Synod in relation to Russia’s advancement of 
spiritual security after the end of the Cold War. It provides a textual analysis of Synodical 
documents and highlights patterns of religious and political structures in the contemporary 
Eastern Orthodox world.  
 
Introduction 
 
Eastern Orthodoxy is a fellowship of fourteen Orthodox churches mainly situated in Eastern 
Europe, Eurasia, North Africa and the Middle East, with a worldwide membership of around 
262 million, namely: 1. The Ecumenical Patriarchate, Turkey; 2. The Greek Orthodox 
Patriarchate of Alexandria, Egypt; 3. The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch, Syria; 4. 
The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem, Israel; 5. The Russian Orthodox Church; 6. 
The Serbian Orthodox Church; 7. The Romanian Orthodox Church; 8. The Bulgarian Orthodox 
Church; 9. The Georgian Orthodox Church; 10. The Orthodox Church of Cyprus; 11. The 
Orthodox Church of Greece; 12. The Orthodox Autocephalous Church of Albania; 13. The 
Polish Orthodox Church; and 14. The Orthodox Church in the Czech Lands and Slovakia. Its 
origins date back to the first divisions in the Christian world, notably the 1054 split which led 
to the Orthodox and Catholic branches of Christianity, the 1453 fall of Constantinople under 
Ottoman rule and the rise of national Orthodox churches in light of state-building processes in 
nineteenth century Eastern and Southeastern Europe.1 The intricate relationship, central to the 
religion, at the state level, between religious and political structures and the daunting linguistic 
barriers thrown up by its large geographical scope, have made Eastern Orthodoxy one of the 
least studied and largely misunderstood world religions. 
After the end of the Cold War, Eastern Orthodoxy has featured regularly in the mass 
media. In The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Samuel Huntington 
reinforced the Western imaginary of Eastern Christian churches. To the question ‘Where does 
Europe end?’ Huntington responded, ‘Europe ends where Western Christianity ends and Islam 
and Orthodoxy begin’. He argued that the concept of the individual, the promotion of human 
rights, and the holding of free elections were alien concepts to the Eastern Orthodox world. 
These assumptions were based on Russia’s trajectory after the fall of communism, when the 
state began to expand its political influence through religious values. Huntington observed that, 
together with five other former Soviet states (Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and 
Georgia), Russia was building an ‘Orthodox bloc’ which challenged the construction of a 
secular European Union. He also placed Bulgaria and Romania in the same ‘Orthodox space’, 
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foreseeing that, due to the predominant Orthodox culture in both of these countries, the 
enlargement of the European Union would most likely not include them.2 
Throughout the last two decades, Huntington’s ‘fault lines’ have haunted the academic 
and public policy communities. The post-1992 conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which linked 
Serbian Orthodoxy to political nationalism, became synonymous with violence, ethnic 
cleansing and forced displacement. By contrast, the 2013 Euromaidan protests in Kiev saw an 
attempt to alleviate conflict, with members of the clergy placing themselves between 
demonstrators and the police. Ukraine has three Orthodox churches competing for national 
status and a government strongly endorsing an independent church outside Moscow’s 
jurisdiction. In Crimea, the cradle of Russian Orthodoxy, and the Donbass region in eastern 
Ukraine, non-Orthodox communities faced difficulties in registering with the new authorities. 
Ukrainian clergymen were forced to leave the occupied territories while the Muslim Tatar 
community was persecuted. The direct engagement of religious communities with forced 
displacement has taken a dramatic turn in the post-2011 Syrian conflict. An unprecedented 
number of displaced people crossed the Aegean Sea, making their journey through 
predominantly-Orthodox countries of Southeastern Europe.  
In March 2014, at the time of Russia’s takeover of Crimea, the heads of all Orthodox 
churches convened under the leadership of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, the Istanbul-
based primus inter pares of the Orthodox commonwealth, and announced that a ‘Holy and 
Great Synod of the Orthodox Church’ would be held in 2016. The Synod had been ‘in 
preparation’ since 1923 when the Ecumenical Patriarchate advanced for the first time the idea 
of bringing together Orthodox churches. In 2014, the decision to hold the Synod was historic. 
Some scholars even claimed that the 2016 Synod could be regarded as a successor to the Second 
Council of Nicaea, the last major pan-denominational summit of Christian churches, which 
took place in 787 CE.  
The Synod took place in June 2016 on the island of Crete, however, one week before 
the official opening, four churches (the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the Patriarchate of 
Antioch, the Georgian Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church), despite attending the 
preliminary meetings and being closely engaged in its preparation, refused to attend. The 
discordant note was evident one month later, when a number of clergy in the Russian Orthodox 
Church declared that a ‘true’ pan-Orthodox Synod could only be held in Moscow, a narrative 
reminiscent of the Cold War period. By focusing on the political mobilisation of Orthodox 
churches, this article argues that the 2016 Synod demonstrated the interconnectedness between 
transnational religious alliances on security and geopolitics in the Eastern Orthodox world. It 
applies a textual, qualitative analysis of Synodical documents to offer insights into religious 
structures, political power and social hierarchies in contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy.  
 
Eastern Orthodoxy and Spiritual Security 
 
The relationship between religion and security is highly contested in international relations 
with religion often regarded as a ‘national security enigma’.3 The theory of security, also 
known as the securitization theory, shifts the focus from offensive/defensive realism (threats, 
control, military capabilities and forces) to the study and implementation of discourses.4 
Religion plays not only a role in societal cohesion but also determines actors’ preferences, 
building international alliances, diplomacy and more widely the nature of international 
society.5 Religion projects a societal security dimension and acts as a transnational security 
framework which endorses authority, mobilisation and geopolitical ambitions.6 Religion is 
directly linked to the concept of ‘sustainable security’ which places emphasis on the promotion 
of strategies in relation to insecurities. Chris Seiple et al argue that ‘sustainable security [is] 
defined not merely as the absence of imminent threats to physical safety but also as the presence 
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of the conditions (socio-economic, political, psychological and spiritual) necessary for long-
term stability and well-being’.7 Religion is thus one of the main factors of security, closely 
linked to other issues such as climate change, resources competition, economic and cultural 
marginalisation, and military technology.8 
While most scholars in international relations have focused on the securitisation of 
Islam in the context of the post-1979 Iranian Revolution and 9/11,9 there is virtually no research 
on the securitisation of Eastern Orthodoxy. The religious and political structure of Eastern 
Orthodoxy enables a unique form of geopolitics which takes into account the security and 
insecurities of not only local religious actors but, more importantly, of state authorities.10 
Throughout the Eastern Orthodox world, the fall of the Iron Curtain was followed by a 
strengthening of relations between the religious and political leadership. For example, in 1990, 
church leaders became members of national parliaments. Churches benefited not only from 
state recognition in working closely with the political authorities but also enjoyed significant 
property restitution and financial support. In Greece, in 2014, the Church retained its extensive 
property ownership despite protests that finance raised through property sales could be used 
towards overcoming the economic crisis. The extent of financial changes was evident, in 
Bulgaria, in 2016, when the Church officially became the second largest land owner, after the 
state.  
The most dynamic interplay between Orthodoxy and security has been evident in 
Russia, with the Church being described by Marcel H. Van Herpen as ‘the Kremlin’s secret 
weapon’.11 As Christopher Marsh has argued in an article published in 2014, this relationship 
is particularly evident in the following examples: ‘1. Assigning protector-saints to the Strategic 
Rocket Forces and individual tank battalions; 2. Using religious symbols in official and 
unofficial military/security capacities; 3. Constructing chapels on the premises of Russian 
governmental agencies; 4. Involving the Patriarch in the inaugural ceremonies of presidents 
Yeltsin, Putin and Medvedev’.12 Most importantly, the Russian Church has access to draft 
legislation prepared for the Duma and legal provisions pertaining to the state-building process. 
The Church and the Russian Foreign Ministry work together on various issues from appointing 
clergy abroad to dealing with judicial cases and organising joint events.13 Marsh’s examples, 
all of which are at the national level, supplement those with a geopolitical, international impact 
such as: 1. The consecration of the Saint George Chapel at the Khmeimim Syrian airbase in 
September 2016; 2. The rise of a small paramilitary group known as ‘the Russian Orthodox 
Army’ in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Despite using this terminology, the paramilitary group 
is not supported by the Moscow Patriarchate; 3. The blessing by Russian clergy of tanks and 
trucks crossing from Russia into eastern Ukraine and Crimea; 4. The advancement of 
‘traditional values’ and the Russkiy Mir (Russian world) in developing the Eurasian Economic 
Union; 5. The building of Orthodox centres in the West advancing Orthodox-state relations, 
such as the inauguration of the Russian Cultural and Spiritual Centre in Paris in 2016; 6. Visits 
by high ranking clergy in the name of cultural and political diplomacy in the Western world, 
including Patriarch Kirill’s trips not only to Britain, France and Italy but more widely to Latin 
America and, for the first time, to Russia’s scientific station on the Island of Waterloo in the 
Antarctic (2016-17); 7. The use of Saint Seraphim of Sarov’s relics in Russia’s space 
programme publicising the uniqueness of Orthodox spirituality and the image of Russia as a 
world superpower at the International Space Station in 2016 and 2017. 
A close link between religion and security is commonly present in Russian 
governmental documents. The 2015 ‘Russian Federation National Security Strategy’ approved 
by Presidential Edict 683 on 31 December includes unusual terminology with regard to religion 
and security. The document presents eight ‘threats to state and public security’, namely: ‘1. 
intelligence and other activity by special services and organizations of foreign states; 2. the 
activities of terrorist and extremist organizations […]; 3. the activities of radical public 
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associations and groups using nationalist and religious extremist ideology […] -- including 
through inciting “colour revolutions” - and destroying traditional Russian religious and moral 
values […]; 4. the activities of criminal organizations and groups […]; 5. the use of information 
and communication technologies; 6. criminal offenses […]; 7. corruption; and, 8. natural 
disasters […].’. The order and hierarchy of these security threats is particularly striking. Thus, 
in third place, activities related to religion are on a par with preventing ‘colour revolutions’, 
granting them more importance than tackling ‘criminal organisations’ and ‘corruption’. The 
document goes further to examine ‘The long-term national strategic interests’ of the Russian 
Federation. In this section, issues related to religious and spiritual values are given a more 
prominent position than the ‘national economy’ and ‘consolidating the Russian Federation’s 
status as a leading world power’; however, according to the order of this section religion is less 
important than ‘strengthening the country’s defence’ (in first place), ‘political and social 
stability’ and ‘raising living standards’.14 
What do the terms ‘religion’ and ‘spiritual’ mean in the 2015 ‘Russian Federation 
National Security Strategy’? In this document, the word ‘church’ is entirely absent, however, 
the word ‘spiritual’ is used twelve times while the word ‘religion/religious’ nine times. A 
similar pattern is visible in Ukraine’s 2003 ‘Law on National Security’, with the words 
‘spiritual/spirituality’ present four times, the word ‘churches’ once, and the word 
‘religious/religion’ four times. In the 2009 ‘National Security Strategy of the Republic of 
Serbia’, the word ‘spiritual’ is missing, however, the word ‘church/churches’ appears four 
times with the word ‘religious/religion’ twenty-two times. The 2007 ‘National Security 
Strategy of the Republic of Armenia’ uses the word ‘spiritual’ five times; the word ‘religion’ 
is entirely absent, while the strategy includes a specific reference to ‘support the spiritual, 
moral, social and cultural activities of the Armenian Apostolic Church’. However, all of these 
references to religion and spirituality are in contrast to the 2015 ‘National Security Strategy’ 
of Romania, where the words ‘spirituality’ and ‘church’ are completely missing, while the word 
‘religious’ is present only three times. None of these documents includes a definition of the 
words ‘spiritual’ or ‘religion’.  
The only document which makes a clear connection between ‘spiritual values’ and their 
national impact is the ‘Russian Federation National Security Strategy’. The subchapter on 
‘Russia and the Modern World’ states that,  
‘Traditional Russian spiritual and moral values are being revived. A proper attitude 
toward Russia’s history is being shaped in the rising generation. We are seeing the 
consolidation of civil society around the common values that shape the foundations of 
statehood such as Russia’s freedom and independence, humanism, interethnic peace 
and accord, the unity of the cultures of the Russian Federation’s multi-ethnic people, 
respect for family and faith traditions, and patriotism’. 
This extensive use of the word ‘spiritual’ indicates the value attached to concepts of religion 
and security in Russia.15 Despite other countries using similar terms in their national security 
strategies, promoting ‘spiritual security’ denotes a close link between religion and geopolitics. 
The concept of ‘spiritual security’ thus has a broader meaning which relates not only to 
protecting the modern state-building process, state institutions and church-state relations but 
more importantly to advancing Russia’s image in international affairs and its recognition as a 
world power. 
The idea of ‘spiritual security’ dates back to 1992 and Russian legislation of national 
security. The term was first employed to emphasise ‘spiritual values’ in opposition to the Soviet 
atheist form of security. The concept acquired a new interpretation during the Putin regime 
(1999-present day) and has regularly been presented as opposing traditional patterns of church-
state relations in modern Western Europe. The realms of religion and politics have been 
delineated in the West as part of the separation of religion and state. This is not the case in 
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Eastern Orthodoxy. Due to the ways in which Eastern Orthodoxy is structured in autocephalous 
(independent) ecclesiastical units in the construction of sovereign nation states, churches 
remain involved not only in human and social security but also provide a link to international 
security by building alliances, conveying diplomatic messages and projecting state power.  
In Eastern Orthodoxy, transnational boundaries are diffuse and involve both religious 
and state interests, promoting a thin line between the ‘spiritual’ and ‘sustainable’ types of 
security. For example, in 2015, the Patriarchate of Antioch, despite the ongoing war in Syria, 
engaged in a dispute involving an Orthodox community in Qatar. In 2013, the Romanian 
Church severed relations with its counterpart in Jerusalem due to a property dispute; through 
the direct support of the Romanian government, ecclesiastical relations were restored. There 
has been constant tension between the Russian Church and the Ecumenical Patriarchate 
regarding recognition of new Orthodox churches and church property in both Eastern and 
Western Europe. In 2003, Igor Ivanov, the Russian Foreign Minister visited the Cathedral of 
the Dormition of the Mother of God in Budapest, the oldest Orthodox church in Hungary, at a 
time when its ownership was disputed between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate. In 2004, the Hungarian Court confirmed Moscow’s jurisdiction over the Cathedral 
in Budapest. Other examples of the nexus between Orthodoxy and security have been evident 
in the ways in which the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Montenegro Orthodox Church 
condemned Montenegro’s intention of joining NATO. There have been regular meetings 
between Serbian and Russian top clergy, not only protesting against military forces in the 
former Yugoslavia but also in addressing religious disputes in relation to the Serbian 
community in Macedonia. In 2015, after Metropolitan Hilarion visited Skopje, where he met 
both religious figures and state officials, Archbishop Jovan, head of a local church who had 
asked for closer ties with the Belgrade Patriarchate rather than a national Macedonian church, 
was released from prison and went to Russia rather than Serbia. 
 
The ‘Holy and Great Synod of the Orthodox Church’ (18-27 June 2016) 
 
The decision to hold the ‘Holy and Great Synod of the Orthodox Church’ can thus be 
considered as the result of a close relationship between Eastern Orthodox churches, security 
and geopolitics. The direct involvement of Orthodox actors in building alliances, conveying 
diplomatic messages and, more importantly, projecting state power were prominent in agreeing 
the agenda and negotiating the final texts. The stakes were high. If adopted by all churches, the 
Synod would have had the possibility of rewriting not only a number of significant 
ecclesiastical jurisdictions (the canonical territory of churches) but the ways in which states 
and security would be defined along Orthodox lines. Issues concerning religious missions, 
diaspora, autonomy/autocephaly and diptychs (the order of priority of the churches in their 
liturgical commemoration) meant that the Synod represented not only the gathering of fourteen 
churches but also the recognition and establishment of new religious communities outside 
traditional centres of religious power. It was no surprise that these issues remained contentious 
through the process of finalising the agenda. 
The 2016 Synod, therefore, took place amid dramatic religious and political tension in 
the Eastern Orthodox world with regard to structures of influence and authority. Notably, 
although the announcement to hold the Synod came in March 2014, at the time of Russia’s 
takeover of Crimea, no Orthodox churches condemned its annexation. The Istanbul meeting 
(6-9 March 2014) agreed that an Inter-Orthodox Committee under the leadership of 
Metropolitan John Zizioulas from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, one of the leading Orthodox 
theologians, should meet and finalise the agenda. Initially, the Synod was scheduled to be held 
in Istanbul in Saint Irene Church, near Topkapi Palace, where the Second Ecumenical Synod 
was held in 381.16 However, after Turkey shot down a Russian military plane in November 
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2015, increasing political tension between the two countries, the location was moved to the 
Orthodox Academy in Crete, an unusual setting with no particular historical symbolism for the 
history of Eastern Orthodoxy, but largely chosen to accommodate the Russian clergy.  
Discussions with a view to agreeing the agenda indicated a polarisation of churches in 
line with the interests of the main religious actors. Ukraine, which has three Orthodox churches, 
was regularly included on the ‘unwritten’ agenda of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the 
Russian Orthodox Church, the two main Orthodox players. President Poroshenko’s call for a 
unified national Ukrainian Orthodox Church which would stand in opposition to the Moscow 
Patriarchate was not officially supported by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the only church which 
has the authority to grant autocephaly in the Orthodox commonwealth. The polarisation 
between Orthodox factions was visible in 2015 when the Bulgarian Orthodox Church sent a 
letter to President Poroshenko condemning the discrimination of the Russian Orthodox Church 
– Moscow Patriarchate. The letter went against diplomatic protocol as heads of churches are 
required to express their positions via diplomatic channels in their own countries rather than 
by directing contacting the heads of other states. By sending the letter, the Bulgarian church 
acted as an international state actor with its own geopolitical ambitions, in this sense supporting 
the ‘spiritual security’ model advanced by Moscow.  
The agreed topics to be discussed at the Synod related closely to the ways in which 
states engaged with the concept of security. Initially, the Synod was due to discuss ten themes 
which were agreed at the First Pre-Conciliar Pan-Orthodox Conference held at Chambésy, 
Switzerland between 2 and 8 November 1976, namely: 1. Orthodox Diaspora; 2. Autocephaly 
and its manner of proclamation. 3. Autonomy and its manner of proclamation; 4. Diptychs. 5. 
The new calendar. 6. Impediments to marriage 7. Adapting church dispositions concerning 
fasting 8. Relations between the Orthodox Church and the rest of the Christian world 9. 
Orthodoxy and the Ecumenical Movement. 10. The contribution of local Orthodox Churches 
to the ideals of peace, freedom, brotherhood and love among people and the removal of racial 
discrimination.17 The agenda was revised at the Synaxis of primates held in Chambésy, 
Switzerland between 21 and 28 January 2016 which decided that each church would be 
represented by 24 bishops and six advisors and that only six topics would be discussed, namely: 
‘(1) The Mission of the Orthodox Church in the Contemporary World, (2) The 
Orthodox Diaspora, (3) Autonomy and its Manner of Proclamation, (4) The Sacrament 
of Marriage and its Impediments, (5) The Significance of Fasting and its Application 
Today, and (6) Relations between the Orthodox Church and the Rest of the Christian 
World’.18 
The order in which these topics were listed was important as it emphasised the three 
most controversial issues directly linked to security, namely the mission of the church, diaspora 
and autonomy. The draft documents were discussed among clergy and lay scholars highlighting 
possible misinterpretations. The Orthodox Theological Society in America set up a special 
project on the Synod supported by Fordham University with academics regularly contributing 
to debates.19 In Greece, a group of theologians affiliated with the Thessaloniki-based Centre 
for Ecumenical, Missiological and Environmental Studies ‘Metropolitan Panteleimon 
Papageorgiou’ noted that the section on ‘Peace and the Aversion of War’ included a reference 
to ‘military manoeuvres’ at times of conflict and state security, which could be interpreted as 
supporting the position of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine.20 Furthermore, the documents 
on diaspora and autonomy proved problematic. ‘The Mission of the Orthodox Church in the 
Contemporary World’, was widely criticised by lay scholars, many arguing that it read as a 
reminder of Cold War propaganda rather than as a new interpretation of Orthodoxy’s 
engagement in the world.21  
Ukraine seemed to be key to the final agenda. At the Chambésy meeting in January 
2016, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow was accompanied by Metropolitan Onufry of Kiev, the head 
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of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Moscow’s jurisdiction, which put direct pressure on 
the other church leaders to recognise his authority in Ukraine. With only a few weeks before 
the official inauguration of the Synod, a number of churches aligned themselves into a distinct 
bloc. On 1 June, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church issued a synodical decision stating that it 
would not attend the Synod due to ‘thematic and organisational changes’.22 The Bulgarian 
‘thematic changes’ were linked to the view put forward during discussions in April 2016 
condemning the possibility of making reference to the term ‘Church’ as a distinct ecclesiastical 
entity for religious communities outside the Orthodox world.23 In practice, this meant that no 
other Christian communities were entitled to be called ‘Church’, a position endorsing Orthodox 
anti-Westernism and the uniqueness of the ‘spiritual security’ model advanced by Russia. On 
6 June, the Patriarchate of Antioch in Damascus declared that due to a number of unresolved 
jurisdictional issues with the Patriarchate of Jerusalem and due to the fact that its leadership 
did not sign the communiques of some Inter-Orthodox meetings, the Church would also refrain 
from attending the Synod.24 On 10 June, the Georgian Orthodox Church declared that due the 
absence of the Bulgarian and Antioch Patriarchate, it would also not attend the Synod.25 As a 
result, on 13 June, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church issued a statement that it 
took note of the refusal of the three churches and decided to follow the same course, 
condemning the Ecumenical Patriarchate for continuing with the Synod despite their absence. 
In the following weeks, the Serbian and Romanian Orthodox churches oscillated between the 
Moscow and Ecumenical patriarchates and agreed at the last minute to send representatives to 
Crete. Support for continuing with the Synod was particularly strong from lay structures, with 
a letter attracting the signatures of over 1,300 academic scholars.26  
The decision of the four churches not to attend the Synod, despite taking part in the 
preparation process in the previous years, was coupled with geopolitics, and in particular the 
religious situation in Ukraine.27 Political overtones became public when five days before its 
official opening, 245 members of the Ukrainian Parliament voted in a resolution asking the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate to approve an independent national church on its territory, outside 
Moscow’s jurisdiction.28 The Synod decided not to address the Ukrainian request and none of 
its documents made reference to international ecclesiastical disputes. The Ukrainian 
Parliament’s resolution was unprecedented. It demonstrated the determination of Ukrainian 
political actors in securing an independent church by timing their decision to coincide with the 
Synod. The presence of the Russian Church at the Synod would, most likely, have impacted 
upon the advancement of ‘spiritual security’, as church hierarchs, faced with a large number of 
mass media outlets across the world,  would have had to have to address publicly the religious 
divisions and the military conflict in Ukraine.   
Furthermore, the absence of Russian hierarchs suggested that the meeting with Pope 
Francis at Havana airport in Cuba just a few months earlier was a more strategic event than the 
Synod. By meeting the pope, the Kremlin offered an alternative image of itself. The soft power 
of the patriarch-pope meeting may entail effective geopolitical advantages with particular 
reference to reducing Western sanctions against Russia.29 The decision to withdraw from the 
Synod was presented by the international mass media as a ‘national’ affair, relating exclusively 
to the four churches. The national characteristic paralleled similar developments in Europe 
taking place at the same time, in particular the unexpected results of the Brexit referendum.30 
Religious solidarity in Bulgaria, Syria and Georgia showed the long arm of Moscow’s 
geopolitics. The actions of the Russian Orthodox Church, indicated that ‘spiritual security’ was 
no longer a national issue but could mobilise religious actors abroad advancing Russian foreign 
policy and geopolitics.31  
Following the meeting in Crete, the Synod issued eight documents published in Greek, 
English, Russian and French, namely: 1. ‘Encyclical of the Holy and Great Council of the 
Orthodox Church’; 2. ‘Message of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church’; 3. 
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‘The Importance of Fasting and Its Observance Today’; 4. ‘Relations of the Orthodox Church 
with the Rest of the Christian World’; 5. ‘Autonomy and the Means by Which it is Proclaimed’; 
6. ‘The Orthodox Diaspora’; 7. ‘The Sacrament of Marriage and its Impediments’; 8. ‘The 
Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World’.32 A textual qualitative analysis of the 
English language version (NVivo Pro 11) which quantifies word frequency, provides some 
interesting insights. The term ‘Orthodox church’ was most frequently used, followed closely 
by ‘God’, ‘Christ’, ‘world’ and ‘humanity’ (Table 1). The analysis shows that rather than 
reading as a propagandistic text reminiscent of the Cold War as had been anticipated at the start 
of the Synod, the key words expressed the challenges faced by Orthodox churches in the 
twenty-first millennium. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Textual word frequency in the documents issued by the 2016 Synod. 
 
By grouping the words together following their generalizations (words with a more 
general meaning), the documents show a completely different picture. As Table 2, indicates 
the most widely used word was ‘lands’, followed by ‘organisation’, ‘acts’, ‘institution’, 
‘divine’, ‘region’ and ‘tradition’. The predominant use of ‘lands’ at the expense of other terms 
was mostly due to the large geographical area covered by the high number of church 
representatives attending the Synod. At the same time, the close grouping of ‘lands’ with other 
terms showed that the Synod’s aim was the reorganisation of the Eastern Orthodox world. The 
absence of the Russian Orthodox Church and the three other churches could thus be perceived 
as acquiring a new dimension, namely the Synod’s potential to engage with the concept of 
spiritual security advanced by Moscow. A reorganisation of the Eastern Orthodox world would 
have benefited either the Moscow Patriarchate or the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The fact that 
the Synod did not address religious jurisdictions meant that the issue of canonical territory will 
remain highly on the future agenda of Orthodox Churches. 
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Figure 2. Generalisation word frequency in the documents issued by the 2016 Synod. 
 
On returning to their countries, the participating church delegations announced that the Synod 
was a landmark event. Proposals were put forward that the Synod should become a regular 
institution, to reconvene again every seven to ten years to address issues of concern to Orthodox 
churches.33 One month after the Synod, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church issued 
a statement declaring that ‘the Council that took place in Crete cannot be considered to be pan-
Orthodox nor the documents adopted by it to be considered as expressing pan-Orthodox 
consensus’.34 The position paralleled that of a number of Russian clergy, who stated that the 
Synod was nothing other than the failure of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to bring together all 
Orthodox churches. They argued that the patriarch’s title (‘ecumenical’ and primus inter pares) 
in the Eastern Orthodox world was no longer appropriate.35 In Cyprus, Greece and Serbia a 
small number of hierarchs who attended the Synod refused to sign the document on ‘Relations 
of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World’ which presented an inclusive 
approach to other Christian confessions rather than promote anti-Westernism.36 In Romania, 
monks from the Moldavian region adopted a similar position and protested against the 
hierarchy for attending the Synod, however, the protest was not widespread. Reactions across 
Eastern Orthodoxy indicated the difficulty of reaching a commonly-agreed position on a wide 
range of controversial issues and that churches remained deeply seated in traditional patterns 
of church-state relations. In addition, the absence of a number of Orthodox churches which are 
not recognised by the fourteen dominant churches, such as the Orthodox Church in America, 
whose autocephaly is contested by a number of Orthodox churches, the Macedonian Orthodox 
Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kiev Patriarchate, throughout the process of 
organising the Pan-Orthodox Synod, meant that its impact would be limited to traditional 
centres of religious and political power.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The 2016 ‘Holy and Great Synod of the Orthodox Church’ demonstrated the close links 
between Eastern Orthodoxy, security and geopolitics. Religious competition in Ukraine, which 
has three Orthodox churches (two national and one under Moscow’s jurisdiction), the changing 
nature of religious demographics in the Middle East, and the emergence of powerful and 
financially independent churches in Eastern and Southeastern Europe after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain all have a long term impact on religious dynamics. Working closely with state 
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authorities, Orthodox churches act as security providers, either at the society or at the political 
level, promoting their own geopolitical interests and following those of their state governments.   
Russia’s advancement of spiritual security after the end of the Cold War has been 
connected not only with state survival and transformation within the international state system 
but, more importantly, with its self-projection as a world power. The advancement of the idea 
of Russkiy Mir, coupled with the conflict in eastern Ukraine and the issue of clarifying its 
canonical territory are key factors in defining Russia’s current geopolitics. The promotion of 
spiritual security in Russia at the expense of sustainable security has an impact on the 
sacralisation of politics in the Eastern Orthodox world. The relationship between Orthodoxy 
and security has highlighted the thin line between religion and geopolitics in the region, and 
the ways in which churches engage in both ‘sustainable’ and ‘spiritual’ types of security. 
Ultimately, state regimes have the final word on which type of security is the most appropriate 
in relation to religion.   
Religion, state interests and diplomacy form an intricate relationship in the Eastern 
Orthodox world. The 2016 Synod confirmed that Eastern Orthodoxy is no longer confined to 
fourteen Orthodox churches but has a wider geopolitical dimension. The diversity of Eastern 
Orthodoxy and the close link between spiritual security and state politics are key factors 
regarding how future religious structures develop. Despite not on the official agenda of the 
Synod, the recognition of a national Ukrainian Church, the plight of Orthodox communities in 
the Middle East, and the migration of refugees affected the decisions adopted by the meeting. 
While it remains unclear if the 2016 Synod will be recognised as a counterpart to the first 
century Ecumenical Councils which defined the organisational structure of Eastern Orthodox 
Christianity, its impact will be evident in the ways in which states engage with Orthodox 
churches. The Synod proved to be not merely a ‘church’ matter but, more importantly an 
assessment of ‘lands’, ‘organisations’ and ‘institutions’, denoting the engagement of 
worldwide Orthodoxy with international affairs.  
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